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Original Article

Synergy and Conflict Within the Transnational Capitalist Class and its Geo-economic Significance

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Abstract: Following the neoliberal globalization, a Transnational Capitalist Class (TCC) has emerged. The richest class of different countries with plutocratic practices belong to this TCC. The synergy and conflicts within the TCC have geopolitical and geo-economic significance. Taking a cue from these earlier observations, this study tries to investigate empirically whether the richest 1% of different countries, as the plutocrats, belong to the TCC and have any synergy or conflict with geo-economic significance. Data on the share of the richest 1% in pre-tax national income for 107 countries and the period 1980-2022 is used from WID.world and then a correlation matrix of the fluctuations in the variable across these countries is prepared. Investigating the correlation matrix, it is found that – (1) the richest 1% of different countries may be taken as belonging to the TCC, (2) they are well-integrated into the TCC, (3) there is both strong synergy and conflict within the TCC, and (4) when the countries are divided into different blocks as per sign and strength of the correlations against the USA, the block structure revealed some geopolitical geo-economic features in line with the expectations. Despite different limitations, this study will be helpful for a country to understand the relation of its plutocrats within the TCC.

Keywords: Institutional Economics, Geo-Economics, Geopolitics, Plutocracy, Political Economy, Richest 1%, Transnational Capital Class.

JEL Classification: B52, O19, P16.

I. INTRODUCTION

Neoliberal globalization started worldwide in the early 1980s. With the fall of the Soviet in December 1991, the reign of capitalism became unchallenged. As discussed in the literature review, consequently, a Transnational Capital Class (TCC) came into prominence. On the one hand, as agents of this TCC, the rich capitalists of different countries, nurturing the nexus of money and politics, try to command the economies of their countries in order to increase the return to capital. There arises the question of plutocracy. The trade-off between return to capital and return to labor, consequently, increases income inequality. The richest 1% of different countries, since the 1980s, have increased their income enormously, whereas the income of the other 99% has increased only meagerly. On the other hand, the transnational character of capital is bound to have an impact on geopolitics and geo-economics since there must be both cooperation and conflict within this class.

Under these premises, this explorative study ventures into some new questions: (1) Can the richest 1% across the nations be taken as belonging to this TCC? (2) If yes, then how well-integrated are they into the TCC? (3) If they are well-integrated into the TCC, then is there any conflict in the TCC? (4) If yes, then what is the geo-economic significance (if any) of cooperation and conflict within the TCC?

These questions are relevant from the perspectives of institutional economics and political economy. The government of a country, if it still truly represents the aspirations of its population rather than that of the richest class only, must identify its richest 1% in the context of the TCC and consider its geopolitical and geo-economic significance (if any) for the welfare of its people.

Combining the arguments and observations placed in the literature review, this research hypothesizes that (1) the plutocrats (the richest 1%) of different countries belong to the TCC, (2) they are well-integrated into the TCC, (3) the TCC has both cooperation and conflict within itself, and (4) the cooperation and conflicts have geo-economic significance.

The purpose of this study is to test this hypothesis on the basis of secondary data. As this is exploratory research, it is not possible to hypothesize what geo-economic significance can exist.

Before explaining the objective of this study in detail, this study adopts two words to describe two events -



- 1. **Synergy**: If the fluctuations in the share of the richest 1% in two countries move in the same direction, then the plutocrats of these two countries are in synergy, i.e., they belong to a single block within the TCC. In this case, their plutocratic commands increase/decrease simultaneously in their own countries.
- 2. **Conflict**: If the fluctuations in the share of the richest 1% in two countries move in the opposite direction, then the plutocrats of these two countries are in competition/conflict., i.e., they belong to two different blocks within the TCC. In this case, when the plutocrats in a country increase their commanding power over their own economy, the commanding power of the plutocrats in another country over its own economy falls.

It might well happen that the share of the richest 1% in the two countries has no definite relation, then this indicates two alternative scenarios – (1) the Plutocrats in the two countries have neither Synergy nor Conflict, i.e., either or both of the Plutocrats in these two countries are not yet well-integrated into the TCC, or (2) the Plutocrats in the two countries are well-integrated into the TCC but they are both in synergy and conflict, i.e., the unique relation between the plutocrats of the two countries is yet to be decided.

On the basis of this, the objective of this study primarily is to trace the existence of the TCC through the lens of the relation between the richest 1% across the countries, and if the richest 1% is found to belong to the TCC, then to find how well-integrated they are into the TCC, and what the block structure of their relation is. The block structure of countries will be such that –

- 1. the richest 1% (assumed to be plutocrats, in general) of one country have synergy with the richest 1% of another country in the same block and
- 2. the richest 1% of one country has conflicts with the richest 1% of another country in another block.

This study uses secondary data retrieved from the World Inequality Database (WID.world). WID.world provides open-source data on different measures of inequality for different countries and regions. WID.world shows, among other measures, how the share of the richest 1% in the pre-tax national income has changed over the years in different countries. Pre-tax National Income is the sum of income of labor, income of capital, and unemployment allowances (Alvaredo et al., 2018). Taking this data for the years 1980-2022 (43 years) and for 107 countries, this study examines the relation between the income-share of the richest 1% for each two of these 107 countries by forming a correlation matrix and then categorizing the countries into different blocks. The correlation matrix, not paying attention to the chronological order of the pairs of values, will place focus on the relation between the fluctuations in the share of the richest 1% across the countries irrespective of when the fluctuations occurred. The special years for different countries due to war, civil unrest, natural calamities, Corona, etc., will not be ignored.

The logical structure of the investigation, i.e., the key questions, possible findings, and their interpretations this study attempts to cover are as follows...

Primary Question:

Is there any relation between the share of the richest 1% (in pre-tax national income) in one country with the same in another country? – There are two possible answers: Yes (Case 1) and No (Case 2).

Case 1: If 'Yes', then the richest 1% of different countries can be considered as belonging to the TCC. But, then –

- 1. How well-integrated are they in the TCC?
- 2. Do they move in the same way?
 - a. If 'Yes', then the richest 1% in all countries belong to the TCC without any conflict among themselves.
 - b. If 'No', then there is conflict within the TCC. But, in that case, if some of them move in the same way, and some others move in different ways, then what is the block structure of the countries on the basis of their relation with each other, and is there any geopolitical geo-economic significance of this block structure?
- Case 2: If 'No', then the richest 1% of different countries do not belong to the TCC, although the capital from which they earn most has a global character. It means there is neither synergy nor conflict among the richest 1% across different countries, or the richest 1% of the countries have both synergy and conflict with each other.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

With the advent of neoliberal globalization since the early 1980s, amongst many other changes, two things have happened which are particularly in the domain of interest of this study -(1) a Transnational Capitalist Class (TCC) has emerged as a global ruling class (Robinson & Harris, 2000), and (2) income inequality has started rising in the developed countries and in many developing countries after its gradual fall over the earlier years in the twentieth century, and this was coupled with a sharp rise in the share of the richest persons (in the present context, the richest 1%) unprecedentedly (Alvaredo et al., 2017b, 2017a; Chancel et al., 2022; Piketty, 2014).

A) The TCC

Regarding the first observation, the TCC owns transnational capital "as embodied principally in the transnational corporations and private financial institutions" (Robinson & Harris, 2000, p. 22). The TCC is different from national or local capitalists because "it is involved in globalized production and manages globalized circuits of accumulation that give it an objective class existence and identity spatially and politically in the global system above any local territories and policies" (Robinson & Harris, 2000, p. 22). The TCC is class-conscious and conscious of its transnationality and pursues the 'class project of capitalist globalization' (Robinson & Harris, 2000). It has formed a Transnational State (TNS), which is a "network of transformed and externally-integrated nation states, together with the supranational economic and political forums" (Robinson, 2001, p. 166). Although the idea of the TNS is not without contentions (Cammack, 2009) and there are views that it is rather the 'states' who are playing the dominant role in shaping the geopolitical economy at the international level (Kurecic, 2015), globalization of financial capitalism, which is hegemonic, most mobile, and most de-territorialized (Robinson & Harris, 2000), has raised questions on the future of financial sovereignty of the nation states (Guoping & Hong, 2015). In this framework of global systems theory, Transnational Practices (TNP) are observed which "occur across borders and do not originate with state actors or agencies" (Sklair, 2006, p. 29). The TNP operate in three spheres – economic, political, and cultural (Sklair, 2006).

The TCC is not without internal conflicts. As Robinson & Harris (2000) observed –

"Despite its [TCC] organization and coherence, the transnational bourgeoisie is not a unified group... Fierce competition among oligopolistic clusters, conflicting pressures, and differences over the tactics and strategy of maintaining class domination and addressing the crises and contradictions of global capitalism make any real internal unity in the global ruling class impossible." (Robinson & Harris, 2000, p. 31)

Robinson & Harris (2000) further observe that "[t]he TCC has become increasingly fragmented in its globalist discourse, in its political vision, and in its ideological coherence" (Robinson & Harris, 2000, p. 42).

B) The Rise of the Richest 1% and Plutocracy

Regarding the second observation, in the context of income inequality, the share of the richest 1% in the national income of different countries has increased magnanimously in this period. A major component of the income of the richest 1% across the countries has been the return on capital, which has grown faster than the national income of those countries (Piketty, 2014). Thus, the richest 1% of different countries can be taken as belonging to the TCC, which has formed a TNS and operates through TNP.

There is no reason to state that it is obvious that any person or family belonging to the richest 1% also belongs to the TCC, posing a threat to the financial sovereignty of the nation the person or family belongs to. If a person becomes richer only through personal skills, knowledge, organizational abilities, etc., used ethically in trade/job, there could hardly be any discontent among others. However, in general, as in the USA, the rich get richer, majorly not through personal skills in trade/job, but with the support of inherited initial endowments, rent-seeking, and state capture (Stiglitz, 2002). There arises the inequality-plutocracy hypothesis – "Money can buy political influence, so unequal income or wealth can translate into unequal ability to influence policy-making" – although there are alternative proposals on why the rich become richer but not through plutocracy in the USA (Kenworthy, 2022). The unequal ability to influence policy-making then translates into a stronger command of money in government policy-making in the USA (Krishna, 2011) – "This confluence of government and business interests meant that government would be more responsive to the few citizens with the most resources, subverting the democratic process in favor of a modern plutocracy" (Piper, 2023, p. 16) – he who pays the piper calls the tune (Barkan, 2013). If plutocracy is considered synonymous with extractive political institutions, then the "... synergistic relationship between extractive economic and political institutions introduces a strong feedback loop: political institutions enable the elites controlling political power to choose economic institutions with few constraints or opposing forces" (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p. 81). At the global level, 'global plutocrats' have appeared, mostly from the rich nations (Milanovic, 2016).

Combining the arguments placed above, it can be inferred that an increase in the share of the richest 1% in national income is indicative of rising plutocracy in the country, where the plutocrats belong to the TCC and through framing and participation in the TNP, they try to dominate (but not replace) the nation-state by the TNS. The existence of the states as political entities is not threatened since it is the states that are the "basic building blocks of the international system", and it is the states "which provide the framework that can be exploited by transnational interests" (Anderson, 1998, p. 107).

C) Geopolitics and Geo-economics

The term 'Geo-economics' was coined first by Luttwak (1990) for describing "... the admixture of the logic of conflict with the methods of commerce—or, as Clausewitz would have written, the logic of war in the grammar of commerce" (Luttwak, 1990, p. 19) in the context of world politics.

Buzan & Lawson (2014), citing Luttwak (1990), explain that Geopolitics is the "zero-sum territorial competition in a military-political mode of relations among states", whereas Geo-economics is the "zero-sum developmental competition in an economic-political mode of relations among states where Great Power war is largely ruled out". Hard Geopolitics means "intentional war is legitimate and expected", whereas Soft Geopolitics means "intentional Great Power war is marginalized, but territorial competition and military balancing/hedging remain". On the other hand, Hard Geo-economics means "a zero-sum competition for profit within a largely political-economic modality", and Soft Geo-economics means "a mix of zero-sum and positive-sum relations within a largely political-economic modality" (Buzan & Lawson, 2014, p. 86). Buzan & Lawson (2014) predict that "[t]he more likely scenario lies in the zone of soft geo-economics in which capitalist powers both compete and cooperate with each other" (Buzan & Lawson, 2014, p. 89). This reiterates the observation by Robinson and Harris (2002) that unity in the global ruling class is impossible.

Shahzad (2022) explains geoeconomics in different terms – "Economics is an activity that creates movement of goods, increases productivity, and brings prosperity. When it becomes a means to gain power and control upon 'others', in addition to these gains, it turns into geo-economics" (Shahzad, 2022, p. 21). Discussing the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, she comments that "... war will still be resorted to, when powerful states find that other means are not bending global trade flows to their own interests" (Shahzad, 2022, p. 38); this indicates that the practice of hard or soft geopolitics might not have been dispensed with yet.

III. DATA & METHODOLOGY

The period 1980-2022 has been selected for two reasons – (1) the nature of income inequality has changed since the year 1980 at the global level, and (2) 2022 is the latest year for which data is available in the WID.world. For these 43 years, and for each of the 107 countries, the variable that has been chosen is the Equal-Split Adult Income-Share of the richest 1% in the pretax national income. 'Equal-split' means that the couples divide their total income equally among themselves. WID.world also provides an alternative measure – 'individualistic' – where couples do not share their income with each other (Alvaredo et al., 2018). Assuming that in the richest 1% of families in any country – (1) the within-couple bargaining power is mostly irrelevant because there is hardly any hindrance for the non-working spouse to avail resources wished, and (2) the number of earning females is much higher than the 'other 99%' – this study has adopted the equal-split measure. The term 'Adult' means people having acquired at least the age of 20 years. (Alvaredo et al., 2018)

The process of selection of the 107 countries is described below.

Worldometer.info is a website "run by an international team of developers, researchers, and volunteers", and the data is "published by a small and independent digital media company based in the United States" (Worldometers.info, 2024). Of the 195 sovereign countries listed by Worldometer, two countries are dropped – Micronesia and Holy See (data was not found in WID.world), and one country is added – Taiwan (although its status is disputed). So, the initial total of countries is 194. Data for these 194 countries is retrieved from the WID.world.

To check the relation of the share of the richest 1% in these countries, a correlation (Pearson's) matrix will be prepared. Before preparing the matrix, the following refinements on the available data are further incorporated.

It is first observed that 34 countries have not had a unique series for 43 years, i.e., at least one other country of these 34 countries has the same series as another of them. These countries are dropped from the present study altogether. For the remaining 160 countries, it is observed that in some cases, the series of a country has the same values in two or more consecutive years. Under the assumption that the values were actually missing and have been replaced by the latest available value, for each of such cases, the first value is retained, and the other values are deleted. However, the values for 1980 are all retained. This deletion will lead to have different number of pairs of values for different pairs of countries – since now, not all countries have 43 values for the 43 years under this study. However, a shortage of values will make the correlations less reliable; on the other hand, seeking too many values will result in dropping too many countries. Therefore, in the next step, those countries are selected which have at least 60% of 43 (i.e. 26) unique values. The figure 60% has been chosen arbitrarily to balance between the reliability of the correlation coefficients and the number of countries incorporated in the analysis. The series of 53 countries failed to fulfill this data requirement. So, finally, 107 countries are selected for preparation of the correlation matrix as listed in Table 1.

Table 1: List of 107 countries taken in the present study (arranged alphabetically)

SN	Country
1	Albania
2	Algeria
3	Armenia
4	Australia
5	Austria
6	Azerbaijan

Country
Bangladesh
Belarus
Belgium
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Botswana
Bulgaria

SN	Country
13	Burkina Faso
14	Burundi
15	Canada
16	China
17	Cote d'Ivoire
18	Croatia

SN	Country
19	Cuba
20	Cyprus
21	Czech Republic
22	Denmark
23	Egypt
24	Equatorial Guinea
25	Eritrea
26	Estonia
27	Ethiopia
28	Finland
29	France
30	Georgia
31	Germany
32	Ghana
33	Greece
34	Guinea
35	Guinea-Bissau
36	Hungary
37	Iceland
38	India
39	Indonesia
40	Iran
41	Ireland
42	Israel
43	Italy
44	Japan
45	Jordan
46	Kazakhstan
47	Kenya
48	Korea
49	Kyrgyzstan

SN	Country
50	Lao PDR
51	Latvia
52	Lesotho
53	Libya
54	Lithuania
55	Luxembourg
56	Madagascar
57	Malaysia
58	Mali
59	Mauritania
60	Moldova
61	Mongolia
62	Montenegro
63	Morocco
64	Nepal
65	Netherlands
66	New Zealand
67	Niger
68	Nigeria
69	North Korea
70	North Macedonia
71	Norway
72	Pakistan
73	Papua New Guinea
74	Peru
75	Philippines
76	Poland
77	Portugal
78	Romania
79	Russian Federation
80	Rwanda

SN	Country
81	Saudi Arabia
82	Senegal
83	Serbia
84	Sierra Leone
85	Singapore
86	Slovakia
87	Slovenia
88	South Africa
89	Spain
90	Sri Lanka
91	Swaziland
92	Sweden
93	Switzerland
94	Taiwan
95	Tanzania
96	Thailand
97	Tunisia
98	Turkey
99	Turkmenistan
100	Uganda
101	Ukraine
102	United Kingdom
103	Uruguay
104	USA
105	Venezuela
106	Viet Nam
107	Zambia

Now, to judge the strength of the correlations, the rule undertaken in this study is presented in Table 2. The two values, 0.75 and 0.4, have been selected partly arbitrarily, partly following conventions, and partly with the aim that the number of countries in all the three categories of strength should be moderate—these two values have been selected after the correlation matrix was formed and analysis was carried out to some extent.

Table 2: Classifying the strength of correlation (r: Pearson's Correlation Coefficient)

Value of r	Strength
$0.75 \le r \le 1$	Strong
$0.40 \le r < 0.75$	Moderate
$0 \le r < 0.40$	Weak or No Correlation (W/NC)

The 'r' being positive means that the richest 1% of the two corresponding countries move in synergy. The 'r' being negative means that the richest 1% of the two corresponding countries are in conflict. The 'r' being closer to zero means that either the richest 1% in the two corresponding countries are neither in synergy nor in competition, or they are in the gray area of both synergy and competition (there might be competing classes within the richest 1% within a country).

Now, to answer the primary question (are they related?), out of the $^{107}C_2 = 5,671$ correlation coefficients, the percentage distribution of strong, moderate, and weak or no correlations will be checked. In the absence of any previous work of a similar nature, it is difficult to fix, in the present context, any threshold level exceeding which the percentage of strong and moderate correlations in the correlation matrix will prove that there exists a relation between the share of the richest 1% of one country with another, in general. So, if only a few such correlations are found, the study will be moved ahead to Case 1 ('Yes'). If, contrary to the expectation, no strong nor moderate correlations are found, the study will end up in Case 2 ('No'), and it will be concluded that the richest 1% across the countries do not belong to the TCC.

Now, if relations exist (Case 1), then, to answer the question no. 1 (how well integrated they are in the TCC), two exercises will be undertaken -

1. For each of the 107 countries, the other 106 countries will be arranged in descending order of the correlation coefficient (this will not be reported), and then, to understand the degree of integrity of the countries in the TCC, the number of strong, moderate, and weak or no correlations in six ranks – 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 106th, 105th, and 104th and their percentage distribution will be reported. On the positive side, lower correlations will mean weaker or no correlation, whereas on

the negative side, lower correlations will mean stronger correlations. Here, the arrangement is not on the basis of the absolute value of the correlation coefficient.

2. Additionally, for each of the 107 countries, the number of correlations according to sign and strength will be reported. Then, to answer the question no. 2 (do they move in the same way?), the study will revert back to the distribution of correlation coefficients prepared to answer the primary question, where the correlations will be classified by strength and sign. If both positive and negative signs are well-populated in the strong and moderate strength categories, then the answer will be – 'No'. If the answer is 'Yes', then there might not be any need to form the block structure. If it is found that they all do not move in the same way, the question no. 2(b) will be taken up.

To answer the question no. 2(b) – what the block structure is, and if there is any geopolitical geo-economic significance of this block structure – two exercises will be undertaken –

- 1. Blocks of countries will be reported. For forming the blocks, the countries will first be arranged on the basis of their correlation with the USA. USA is being selected as the Nodal Country for two reasons (1) it has all 43 unique values for the 43 years, and (2) in the post-Soviet unipolar world, USA is generally considered as the unique pole. Then, the remaining 106 countries will be grouped on the basis of two criteria (1) sign of the correlation coefficient (Positive, Negative), and (2) strength of the correlation Coefficient (Strong, Moderate, W/NC). Thus, there will be, hypothetically, six blocks of countries. Although the positive and negative blocks will show synergy and conflict, dividing them further according to strength will show the continuum from synergy to conflict.
- 2. It will also be reported for each of the 107 countries (A) which three countries have the highest correlation having rank 1st, 2nd, and 3rd, and (B) which three countries have the lowest correlation having rank 106th, 105th, and 104th. The corresponding correlation coefficients will also be reported. This second exercise will be undertaken as an aid for explaining the block structure derived in the previous exercise.

After the formation of the blocks, the blocks will partially and manually be investigated to check if any geo-economic significance is visible in this block structure. If it is found that the block structure has no geo-economic significance, then, it will be concluded that the synergy or conflicts among the richest 1% across the countries are not guided by geo-economic interests; although, they belong to the TCC and are well-integrated in it.

IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

In this section, the analyses will be carried out step by step, following the logical structure of the investigation described in the introduction.

A) Investigating the primary question – whether there is any relation

Grand Total

% of Row Total

After deriving the correlation matrix (not reported here), Table 3 is prepared. Table 3 gives the number of correlations of different strengths and signs as found in the correlation matrix.

Sign of r POSITIVE NEGATIVE **Grand Total** Strength of r No. of Correlations 323 809 486 **STRONG** % of Column Total 15.58 12.66 14.27 % of Row Total 60.07 39.93 100.00 No. of Correlations 1137 855 1992 **MODERATE** % of Column Total 36.45 33.50 35.13 % of Row Total 42.92 100.00 57.08 No. of Correlations 1496 1374 2870 W/NC % of Column Total 47.96 53.84 50.61 % of Row Total 52.13 47.87 100.00 No. of Correlations 2552 5671 3119

Table 3: Distribution of correlation coefficients according to their strength and sign

As observed from Table 3, 14.27% of all the 5,671 correlation coefficients are strong, of which 60.07% are positive and 39.93% are negative. 35.13% are moderately strong correlations, of which 57.08% are positive and 42.92% are negative.

55.00

45.00

100

The primary question of this study was whether there is any relation between the share of the richest 1% (in pre-tax national income) in one country with the same in another country. Since strong and moderately strong correlations are almost half of all the correlations, the answer is – yes – in tune with the expectation. This proves that – the richest 1% across countries are interrelated in the context of their share in the national income of their own countries; i.e., the richest 1% of different countries can be taken as belonging to the TCC, and hence their commands over their own countries through extractive powers are also interrelated.

The first query in Case 1 of the logical structure of the investigation is taken up in the next section.

B) Investigating the question no. 1 – how well integrated the countries are in the TCC

Table 4: Distribution of 107 countries according to the strength and sign of correlation at the three highest and lowest ranks

Strength	Sign		Positive		Negative				
Suengui	Rank	Rank 1	Rank 2	Rank 3	Rank 106	Rank 105	Rank 104		
Ctuono	Number of Countries	84	71	65	75	67	58		
Strong	% of Column Total	78.50	66.36	60.75	70.09	62.62	54.21		
Moderate	Number of Countries	23	36	41	32	40	44		
Moderate	% of Column Total	21.50	33.64	38.32	29.91	37.38	41.12		
W/NC	Number of Countries	0	0	1	0	0	5		
W/NC	% of Column Total	0.00	0.00	0.93	0.00	0.00	4.67		
	Grand Total	107	107	107	107	107	107		

Table 5A represents, for each of the 107 countries, how many strong, moderate, and weak or no correlations are there, for both positive and negative correlations. The list is arranged first, in descending order of the number of correlations found in the Positive-Strong category, then in descending order of the number of correlations found in the Positive-Moderate category, and then in descending order of the number of correlations found in the Positive-W/NC category. In Table 5B, the same has been done but in descending order of the number of correlations found in the respective strength categories for the negative sign. (Note: Bosnia and Herzegovina have been abbreviated as B&H, Strong as STR, and Moderate as MOD.)

Table 5A: List of 107 countries with the number of correlations for each sign and strength (arranged in descending

order of the number of correlations in the strength category on the positive side)

	order or t			ITIVE				ATIVE	<i>J</i>		Total	,	O.T.
Rank	Country	STR	MOD	W/NC	Total	STR	MOD	W/NC	Total	STR	MOD	W/NC	GT
1	India	36	15	15	66	16	11	13	40	52	26	28	106
2	Australia	35	14	18	67	14	10	15	39	49	24	33	106
3	Russian Federation	32	19	17	68	7	17	14	38	39	36	31	106
4	South Africa	31	22	15	68	12	13	13	38	43	35	28	106
5	Rwanda	30	21	21	72	5	17	12	34	35	38	33	106
6	Hungary	30	21	16	67	12	12	15	39	42	33	31	106
7	Poland	29	22	13	64	11	14	17	42	40	36	30	106
8	China	29	19	15	63	11	12	20	43	40	31	35	106
9	Taiwan	26	23	17	66	13	14	13	40	39	37	30	106
10	Slovakia	26	22	17	65	12	14	15	41	38	36	32	106
11	United Kingdom	25	28	17	70	10	13	13	36	35	41	30	106
12	USA	25	24	16	65	11	13	17	41	36	37	33	106
13	В&Н	25	24	15	64	10	16	16	42	35	40	31	106
14	Canada	23	27	19	69	4	15	18	37	27	42	37	106
15	France	23	27	17	67	5	16	18	39	28	43	35	106
16	Croatia	23	27	14	64	12	17	13	42	35	44	27	106
17	Tanzania	21	20	22	63	13	20	10	43	34	40	32	106
18	Czech Republic	20	27	27	74	2	11	19	32	22	38	46	106
19	Norway	19	29	22	70	7	15	14	36	26	44	36	106
20	Sri Lanka	19	27	22	68	8	17	13	38	27	44	35	106
21	Portugal	18	31	19	68	2	14	22	38	20	45	41	106
22	Singapore	18	31	18	67	7	17	15	39	25	48	33	106
23	Bangladesh	16	34	22	72	4	16	14	34	20	50	36	106
24	Italy	16	30	18	64	6	17	19	42	22	47	37	106
25	Latvia	14	30	24	68	3	18	17	38	17	48	41	106
26	Romania	14	27	25	66	5	17	18	40	19	44	43	106
27	Zambia	14	24	20	58	11	19	18	48	25	43	38	106
28	Lesotho	14	14	10	38	30	18	20	68	44	32	30	106
29	Netherlands	13	37	17	67	2	17	20	39	15	54	37	106
30	North Korea	13	31	18	62	10	17	17	44	23	48	35	106
31	Serbia	12	34	23	69	2	20	15	37	14	54	38	106
32	Iran	12	17	14	43	21	24	18	63	33	41	32	106
33	Montenegro	11	31	28	70	4	20	12	36	15	51	40	106
34	Germany	11	31	22	64	8	18	16	42	19	49	38	106
35	Denmark	11	26	25	62	5	16	23	44	16	42	48	106
36	Papua New Guinea	11	20	15	46	14	23	23	60	25	43	38	106
37	Burkina Faso	11	16	24	51	14	20	21	55	25	36	45	106
38	Mali	11	14	20	45	21	22	18	61	32	36	38	106

		I	POS	ITIVE			NEG	ATIVE			Total		
Rank	Country	STR	MOD	W/NC	Total	STR	MOD	W/NC	Total	STR	MOD	W/NC	GT
39	Tunisia	11	14	18	43	16	28	19	63	27	42	37	106
40	Senegal	11	14	15	40	25	21	20	66	36	35	35	106
41	Moldova	10	34	19	63	6	12	25	43	16	46	44	106
42	Bulgaria	10	33	22	65	4	10	27	41	14	43	49	106
43	Swaziland Lithuania	10	13 32	17 21	40 62	<u>22</u> 5	22 19	22 20	66 44	32 14	35 51	39 41	106 106
	Malaysia	9	18	15	42	7	33	24	64	16	51	39	106
46	-	9	16	17	42	28	21	15	64	37	37	32	106
47	Egypt	8	40	19	67	4	14	21	39	12	54	40	106
48	Mongolia	8	29	27	64	7	17	18	42	15	46	45	106
49	Algeria	8	15	13	36	33	19	18	70	41	34	31	106
50	Finland	7	44	21	72	1	10	23	34	8	54	44	106
51	Ghana	7	31	26	64	8	17	17	42	15	48	43	106
52	Guinea	7	22	21 15	50 38	16	26 29	26 23	56 68	11 23	48 45	47 38	106
53 54	Eritrea Kazakhstan	7	16 33	33	72	16	18	15	34	7	51	48	106 106
55	Turkey	6	16	16	38	19	29	20	68	25	45	36	106
56	Ireland	5	38	30	73	0	10	23	33	5	48	53	106
57	Japan	5	25	32	62	5	14	25	44	10	39	57	106
58		5	17	28	50	3	19	34	56	8	36	62	106
59	Korea	4	22	33	59	5	23	19	47	9	45	52	106
60	Slovenia	3	34	34	71	2	11	22	35	5	45	56	106
61	New Zealand	3	33	29	65	0	9	32	41	3	42	61	106
62	Nigeria Cuba	3	25 24	33 31	61 58	0	12 19	33 28	45 48	3	37	66 59	106
64	Guinea-Bissau	3	18	15	36	19	30	28	70	4 22	43 48	36	106 106
65	Libya	3	16	24	43	10	33	20	63	13	49	44	106
66	Israel	2	37	32	71	4	8	23	35	6	45	55	106
67	Ethiopia	2	22	21	45	2	39	20	61	4	61	41	106
68	Ukraine	2	18	20	40	0	34	32	66	2	52	52	106
69	Burundi	2	16	41	59	1	11	35	47	3	27	76	106
70	Nepal	2	15	60	77	0	6	23	29	2	21	83	106
71	Madagascar Pakistan	2	13	17 34	32 75	1	40	33 20	74 31	3	53	50 54	106
73	Sweden	1	40 38	28	67	0	11 14	24	39	1 2	51 52	52	106 106
74	Estonia	1	34	37	72	0	2	32	34	1	36	69	106
75	Turkmenistan	1	26	31	58	2	25	21	48	3	51	52	106
76	Uruguay	1	25	37	63	0	13	30	43	1	38	67	106
77	Niger	1	24	39	64	0	10	32	42	1	34	71	106
78	Equatorial Guinea	1	21	18	40	3	37	26	66	4	58	44	106
79	Mauritania	1	19	20	40	0	42	24	66	1	61	44	106
80	Kenya	1	18	19	38	8	32	28	68	9	50	47	106
81	Thailand Greece	1	16 15	26 58	43 74	0	31	30 26	63 32	3	47 21	56 84	106 106
	Botswana	1	13	39	53	0	6	44	53	1	22	83	106
	Belarus	1	11	47	59	0	8	39	47	1	19	86	106
	North Macedonia	0	23	47	70	0	7	29	36	0	30	76	106
86	Armenia	0	23	25	48	0	27	31	58	0	50	56	106
87	Luxembourg	0	18	46	64	0	4	38	42	0	22	84	106
	Iceland	0	16	52	68	0	2	36	38	0	18	88	106
	Venezuela	0	16	51	67	0	6	33	39	0	22	84	106
	Cote d'Ivoire	0	15	49	64	0	11	31	42	0	26	80	106
	Lao PDR Jordan	0	13 13	64 38	77 51	2	16	27 37	29 55	2	15 29	91 75	106 106
	Morocco	0	12	25	37	1	15	53	69	1	29	78	106
93		0	11	68	79	0	2	25	27	0	13	93	106
	Belgium	0	10	56	66	0	3	37	40	0	13	93	106
	Uganda	0	10	50	60	0	3	43	46	0	13	93	106
97	Azerbaijan	0	10	37	47	0	9	50	59	0	19	87	106
	Saudi Arabia	0	10	26	36	3	26	41	70	3	36	67	106
	Austria	0	8	49	57	0	4	45	49	0	12	94	106
	Georgia	0	8	44	52	0	8	46	54	0	16	90	106
	Kyrgyzstan	0	6	39	45	1	8	52	61	1	14	91	106
102	Spain	0	6	35	41	0	11	54	65	0	17	89	106

Donk	Country	POSITIVE				NEGATIVE					GT		
Kank	Country	STR	MOD	W/NC	Total	STR	MOD	W/NC	Total	STR	MOD	W/NC	GI
103	Albania	0	5	48	53	0	2	51	53	0	7	99	106
104	Indonesia	0	4	48	52	0	10	44	54	0	14	92	106
105	Viet Nam	0	3	40	43	0	3	60	63	0	6	100	106
106	Cyprus	0	3	27	30	0	5	71	76	0	8	98	106
107	Switzerland	0	2	63	65	0	3	38	41	0	5	101	106
	Grand Total	972	2274	2992	6238	646	1710	2748	5104	1618	3984	5740	11342
	Grand Total ÷ 2	486	1137	1496	3119	323	855	1374	2552	809	1992	2870	5671

Table 5B: List of 107 countries with the number of correlations for each sign and strength (arranged in descending order of the number of correlations in the strength category on the negative side)

	order or t	110 1101		ITIVE				ATIVE	71 011 0	ne nega	Total		
Rank	Country	STR	MOD	W/NC	Total	STR	MOD	W/NC	Total	STR	MOD	W/NC	GT
1	Algeria	8	15	13	36	33	19	18	70	41	34	31	106
	Lesotho	14	14	10	38	30	18	20	68	44	32	30	106
	Sierra Leone	9	16	17	42	28	21	15	64	37	37	32	106
	Senegal	11	14	15	40	25	21	20	66	36	35	35	106
5	Swaziland	10	13	17	40	22	22	22	66	32	35	39	106
6	Iran	12	17	14	43	21	24	18	63	33	41	32	106
7	Mali	11	14	20	45	21	22	18	61	32	36	38	106
8	Guinea-Bissau	3	18	15	36	19	30	21	70	22	48	36	106
9	Turkey	6	16	16	38	19	29	20	68	25	45	36	106
10	Eritrea	7	16	15	38	16	29	23	68	23	45	38	106
11	Tunisia	11	14	18	43	16	28	19	63	27	42	37	106
12	India	36	15	15	66	16	11	13	40	52	26	28	106
13	Papua New Guinea	11	20	15	46	14	23	23	60	25	43	38	106
14	Burkina Faso	11	16	24	51	14	20	21	55	25	36	45	106
15	Australia	35	14	18	67	14	10	15	39	49	24	33	106
16	Tanzania	21	20	22	63	13	20	10	43	34	40	32	106
17	Taiwan	26	23	17	66	13	14	13	40	39	37	30	106
18	Croatia	23	27	14	64	12	17	13	42	35	44	27	106
19	Slovakia	26	22	17	65	12	14	15	41	38	36	32	106
20	South Africa	31	22	15	68	12	13	13	38	43	35	28	106
21	Hungary	30	21	16	67	12	12	15	39	42	33	31	106
22	Zambia	14	24	20	58	11	19	18	48	25	43	38	106
23	Poland	29	22	13	64	11	14	17	42	40	36	30	106
24	USA	25	24	16	65	11	13	17	41	36	37	33	106
25	China	29	19	15	63	11	12	20	43	40	31	35	106
	Libya	3	16	24	43	10	33	20	63	13	49	44	106
27	North Korea	13	31	18	62	10	17	17	44	23	48	35	106
28	B&H	25	24	15	64	10	16	16	42	35	40	31	106
29	United Kingdom	25	28	17	70	10	13	13	36	35	41	30	106
	Kenya	1	18	19	38	8	32	28	68	9	50	47	106
31	Germany	11	31	22	64	8	18	16	42	19	49	38	106
32	Ghana	7	31	26	64	8	17	17	42	15	48	43	106
33	Sri Lanka	19	27	22	68	8	17	13	38	27	44	35	106
	Malaysia	9	18	15	42	7	33	24	64	16	51	39	106
	Mongolia	8	29	27	64	7	17	18	42	15	46	45	106
	Singapore	18	31	18	67	7	17	15	39	25	48	33	106
37	Russian Federation	32	19	17	68	7	17	14	38	39	36	31	106
38	-	19	29	22	70	7	15	14	36	26	44	36	106
	Italy	16	30	18	64	6	17	19	42	22	47	37	106
40	Moldova	10	34	19 33	63 59	6	12	25 19	43 47	16 9	46	44	106
41	Korea	9	32	21	62	5	23	20	47		45 51	52	106
42	Lithuania	14	27	25	66	5	19 17	18	40	14 19	44	41	106 106
	Romania Rwanda	30											106
		11		21	72	5	17	12	34	35	38	33	
45		23	26 27	25	62 67	5	16	23	44 39	16	42	48	106
	France Japan	5	25	17 32	62	5	16 14	18 25		28	43 39	35	106
48		7	22	21	50	4	26	26	44 56	10 11	48	57 47	106
	Montenegro	11	31	28	70	4	26	12	36	11	51	47	106 106
			34	28	70				34		50		
	Bangladesh	16 23	27	19	69	4	16	14	37	20		36	106
51		8		19	67	4	15	18 21		27	42	37	106
52	Egypt	8	40	19	6/	4	14	21	39	12	54	40	106

Rank	Commtun		1 031	TIVE			NEG	ATIVE			Total		GT
	Country	STR	MOD	W/NC	Total	STR	MOD	W/NC	Total	STR	MOD	W/NC	GI
53	Bulgaria	10	33	22	65	4	10	27	41	14	43	49	106
	Israel	2	37	32	71	4	8	23	35	6	45	55	106
	Equatorial Guinea	1	21	18	40	3	37	26	66	4	58	44	106
56	Saudi Arabia	0	10	26	36	3	26	41	70	3	36	67	106
	Philippines	5	17	28	50	3	19	34	56	8	36	62	106
58	Latvia	14	30	24	68	3	18	17	38	17	48	41	106
59	Ethiopia	2	22	21	45	2	39	20	61	4	61	41	106
60	Thailand	1	16	26	43	2	31	30	63	3	47	56	106
61	Turkmenistan	1	26	31	58	2	25	21	48	3	51	52	106
62	Serbia	12	34	23	69	2	20	15	37	14	54	38	106
63	Netherlands	13	37	17	67	2	17	20	39	15	54	37	106
64	Jordan	0	13	38	51	2	16	37	55	2	29	75	106
	Portugal	18	31	19	68	2	14	22	38	20	45	41	106
66	Slovenia	3	34	34	71	2	11	22	35	5	45	56	106
67	Czech Republic	20	27	27	74	2	11	19	32	22	38	46	106
68	Madagascar	2	13	17	32	1	40	33	74	3	53	50	106
	Cuba	3	24	31	58	1	19	28	48	4	43	59	106
70	Kazakhstan	6	33	33	72	1	18	15	34	7	51	48	106
71	Morocco	0	12	25	37	1	15	53	69	1	27	78	106
	Sweden	1	38	28	67	1	14	24	39	2	52	52	106
73	Burundi	2	16	41	59	1	11	35	47	3	27	76	106
74	Finland	7	44	21	72	1	10	23	34	8	54	44	106
	Kyrgyzstan	0	6	39	45	1	8	52	61	1	14	91	106
76	Mauritania	1	19	20	40	0	42	24	66	1	61	44	106
77	Ukraine	2	18	20	40	0	34	32	66	2	52	52	106
	Armenia	0	23	25	48	0	27	31	58	0	50	56	106
	Uruguay	1	25	37	63	0	13	30	43	1	38	67	106
	Nigeria	3	25	33	61	0	12	33	45	3	37	66	106
81	Spain	0	6	35	41	0	11	54	65	0	17	89	106
	Cote d'Ivoire	0	15	49	64	0	11	31	42	0	26	80	106
	Pakistan	1	40	34	75 52	0	11	20	31	1	51	54	106
84	Indonesia	0	4	48	52	0	10	44	54	0	14	92	106
85	Niger	1	24	39	64	0	10	32	42	1	34	71	106
86	Ireland	5	38	30	73	0	10	23	33	5	48	53	106
87 88	Azerbaijan	0	10 13	37 39	47 53	0	9	50	59 53	0	19 22	87 83	106 106
	Botswana New Zealand	1 3	33	29	65	0	9	32	41	3	42	61	106
		0		44	52	0		46	54	0	16	90	106
	Georgia Belarus	1	8 11	44	59	0	8	39	47	1	19	86	106
	North Macedonia	0	23	47	70	0	7	29	36	0	30	76	106
92	Venezuela	0	16	51	67	0	6	33	39	0	22	84	106
93	Greece	1	15	58	74	0	6	26	32	1	21	84	106
		2	15	60	77	0	6	23	29	2	21	83	106
95	Cyprus	0	3	27	30	0	5	71	76	0	8	98	106
	Austria	0	8	49	57	0	4	45	49	0	12	94	106
	Luxembourg	0	18	46	64	0	4	38	42	0	22	84	106
	Viet Nam	0	3	40	43	0	3	60	63	0	6	100	106
	Uganda	0	10	50	60	0	3	43	46	0	13	93	106
	Switzerland	0	2	63	65	0	3	38	40	0	5	101	106
	Belgium	0	10	56	66	0	3	37	40	0	13	93	106
	Albania	0	5	48	53	0	2	51	53	0	7	99	106
	Iceland	0	16	52	68	0	2	36	38	0	18	88	106
	Estonia	1	34	37	72	0	2	32	34	1	36	69	106
	Lao PDR	0	13	64	77	0	2	27	29	0	15	91	106
	Peru	0	11	68	79	0	2	25	29	0	13	93	106
107	Grand Total	972	2274	2992	6238	646	1710	2748	5104	1618	3984	5740	11342
		9//	44/4	Z99Z	0236	040	1/10	2748	2104	1019	J 3704	3/40	11342

Table 4 suggests that all 107 countries have at least a moderately strong positive correlation with three other countries with which they have the highest positive correlation, the only exception is Switzerland (see Table 5A). Similarly, all the 107 countries have at least a moderately strong negative correlation with three other countries with which they have the lowest negative correlation (it is strong on the negative side), but there are five exceptional countries in this case – Albania, Estonia, Iceland, Lao PDR, and Peru (See Table 5B). Ignoring these exceptions, it can be concluded that all the countries have at least

three other countries with which they have at least moderately strong positive correlation and at least three other countries with which they have at least moderately strong negative correlation.

Tables 4, 5A, and 5B, although they do not specify the list of countries for each of the signs and strengths, show together that excepting a few countries, the number of strong and moderate correlations both on positive and negative sides are high enough to integrate the countries well into the TCC.

This proves that no country is outside the gambit of the TCC; rather they are strongly interrelated in terms of the fluctuations in the share of the richest 1% in the national income of the countries.

Now, the study moves to question No. 2 in Case 1.

C) Investing the question no. 2 – whether they move in the same way or not

As evident from Table 3, there are both positive and negative correlations. Of all the correlations (5,671), 55% are positive correlations, and 45% are negative correlations. Of all the positive correlations, 52.03% are strong or moderately strong correlations, and of all the negative correlations, 46.16% are strong or moderately strong correlations. This proves that they do not move in the same way, i.e., the richest 1% of different countries belonging to the TCC have both strong or at least moderately strong synergy and conflict – and adding observations from section 3.2 – at least with three other countries.

So, the study now moves to question no. 2(b).

D) Investigating the question no. 2(b) – the block structure and its geopolitical geo-economic significance

Tables 6A & 6B represent the blocks of the other 106 countries on the basis of their correlation coefficient with the USA for positive and negative correlations, respectively. The two tables can be taken as representing two blocks of positive and negative correlations, but to describe the continuum from synergy to conflict, the blocks have been further subdivided based on the strength of the correlations.

Table 6A: Three blocks of countries all having a positive correlation with the USA

Block Name		STR+			MOD+		WNC+				
Strength		Strong			Moderate			W/NC			
	SN	Country	r	SN	Country	r	SN	Country	r		
	1	Australia	0.934	1	Zambia	0.749	1	Turkmenistan	0.386		
	2	Italy	0.932	2	New Zealand	0.741	2	Greece	0.343		
	3	India	0.930	3	Singapore	0.710	3	North Macedonia	0.312		
	4	Croatia	0.922	4	Sri Lanka	0.701	4	Belgium	0.297		
	5	Hungary	0.919	5	Sweden	0.701	5	Georgia	0.270		
	6	China	0.912	6	6 Ireland		6	Lao PDR	0.241		
	7	France	0.892	7	Slovenia	0.688	7	Jordan	0.148		
	8	Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.883	8	North Korea	0.650	8	Cote d'Ivoire	0.132		
	9	Russian Federation	0.873	9	Moldova	0.644	9	Kyrgyzstan	0.118		
	10	Denmark	0.851	10	Serbia	0.630	10	Iceland	0.117		
	11	Portugal	0.847	11	Latvia	0.628	11	Switzerland	0.096		
List of	12	Tanzania	0.838	12	Ghana	0.616	12	Peru	0.083		
Countries	13	Poland	0.835	13	Romania	0.615	13	Nepal	0.059		
	14	South Africa	0.824	14	Bangladesh	0.613	14	Burundi	0.045		
	15	Bulgaria	0.819	15	Finland	0.604	15	Indonesia	0.038		
	16	Slovakia	0.818	16	Japan	0.585	16	Venezuela	0.029		
	17	Rwanda	0.812	17	Norway	0.584					
	18	Netherlands	0.811	18	Korea	0.582					
	19	United Kingdom	0.810	19	Montenegro	0.580					
	20	Canada	0.805	20	Mongolia	0.570					
	21	Lithuania	0.784	21	Israel	0.512					
	22	Germany	0.777	22	Kazakhstan	0.446					
	23	Egypt	0.773	23	Estonia	0.432					
	24	Taiwan	0.767	24	Pakistan	0.412					
	25	Czech Republic	0.750								

Table 6B: Three blocks of countries all having a negative correlation with the USA

Block Name		STR-			MOD-	WNC-				
Strength		Strong			Moderate		W/NC			
	SN	Country	r	SN	Country	r	SN	Country	r	
	1	Lesotho	-0.920	1	Libya	-0.716	1	Madagascar	-0.393	
	2	Senegal	-0.882	2	Thailand	-0.679	2	Uruguay	-0.378	
	3	Swaziland	-0.866	3	Eritrea	-0.641	3	Nigeria	-0.341	
	4	Iran	-0.864	4	Malaysia	-0.628	4 5	Austria Armenia	-0.328	
	5	Guinea-Bissau	-0.843	5	Guinea	-0.624			-0.294	
	6 Algeria		-0.838	6	Burkina Faso	-0.621	6	Cyprus	-0.271	
	7	Mali	-0.833	7	Mauritania	-0.576	7	Niger	-0.246	
List of	8	Sierra Leone	-0.831	8	Cuba	-0.553	8	Belarus	-0.223	
Countries	9	Turkey	-0.789	9	Papua New Guinea	-0.552	9	Azerbaijan	-0.168	
	10	Tunisia	-0.776	10	Ukraine	-0.552	10	Botswana	-0.161	
	11	Kenya	-0.763	11	Ethiopia	-0.457	11	Luxembourg	-0.119	
				12	Equatorial Guinea	-0.434	12	Morocco	-0.115	
				13	Philippines	-0.410	13	Spain	-0.101	
							14	Viet Nam	-0.096	
							15	Uganda	-0.094	
							16	Saudi Arabia	-0.048	
							17	Albania	-0.014	

Table 7 presents the list of 107 countries against each of which three other countries having the highest correlation and three other countries having the lowest correlation are shown. In the table, r(x) represents the correlation coefficient of the country in the x-th position when the other 106 countries (relative to the country mentioned in the corresponding row) are arranged in decreasing order of the value (not absolute value) of the correlation coefficient.

Table 7: Three other countries having the highest and the lowest correlations for each of the 107 countries (arranged in alphabetical order)

alphabetical order)														
SN	Country			Highest			Lowest							
514	·	1st country	r (1)	2 nd country	r (2)	3 rd country	r (3)	106th country		,	r (105)	104 th country	r (104)	
1	Albania	Greece		Eq. Guinea	0.492	- ,		Israel		Jordan		Switzerland	-0.365	
2	Algeria	Sierra Leone		Lesotho	0.889	Kenya	0.886	Latvia	-0.958	B&H	-0.954	Hungary	-0.952	
3	Armenia	Tunisia	0.709	Sierra Leone	0.703	Swaziland	0.691	India	-0.717	Romania	-0.670	North Korea	-0.668	
4	Australia	India	0.954		0.934	China	0.932	Senegal		Sierra Leone	-0.962	Mali	-0.940	
5	Austria	Uruguay	0.745	Cuba	0.634	Niger		Lithuania	-0.428	Saudi Arabia	-0.413	Italy	-0.407	
6	Azerbaijan	Burkina Faso	0.579	Philippines	0.543	Lesotho	0.520	Taiwan	-0.567	B&H	-0.529	Montenegro	-0.523	
7	Bangladesh	Rwanda	0.898	Russian Fed.	0.890	UK	0.854	Algeria	-0.942	Kenya	-0.787	Guinea-Bissau	-0.767	
8	Belarus	Nepal	0.772	Burundi	0.697	Botswana	0.688	Korea	-0.667	Kyrgyzstan	-0.583	Ghana	-0.557	
9	Belgium	Japan	0.550	Lao PDR	0.543	Germany	0.540	Viet Nam	-0.507	Guinea	-0.426	Senegal	-0.414	
10	B&H	Croatia	0.930	South Africa	0.916	Hungary	0.909	Algeria	-0.954	Lesotho	-0.912	Kenya	-0.875	
11	Botswana	Nepal	0.875	Belarus	0.688	Ethiopia	0.679	Tanzania	-0.646	Cote d'Ivoire	-0.598	Korea	-0.591	
12	Bulgaria	Italy	0.917	B&H	0.841	Hungary	0.836	Kenya	-0.876	Algeria	-0.842	Thailand	-0.807	
13	Burkina Faso	Philippines	0.974	PNG	0.870	Malaysia	0.868	Ghana	-0.906	Tanzania	-0.899	Korea	-0.896	
14	Burundi	Philippines	0.801	Burkina Faso	0.761	Eq. Guinea	0.735	Kyrgyzstan	-0.800	Jordan	-0.718	Morocco	-0.711	
15	Canada	Rwanda	0.968	France	0.932	Russian Fed.	0.925	Algeria	-0.836	Sierra Leone	-0.824	Eritrea	-0.804	
16	China	India	0.971	South Africa	0.954	Croatia	0.934	Senegal	-0.966	Lesotho	-0.941	Mali	-0.920	
17	Cote d'Ivoire	Cuba	0.716	Niger	0.547	Ireland	0.533	Indonesia	-0.684	Turkmenistan	-0.673	Ethiopia	-0.613	
18	Croatia	India	0.963	India	0.963	Hungary	0.944	Lesotho	-0.969	Senegal	-0.939	Algeria	-0.914	
19	Cuba	Uruguay	0.833	Guinea	0.794	Nigeria	0.761	Tanzania	-0.753	Korea	-0.700	B&H	-0.672	
20	Cyprus	Tunisia	0.503	Saudi Arabia	0.445	Eq. Guinea	0.407	Morocco	-0.498	Netherlands	-0.469	Sweden	-0.455	
21	Czech Republic	Hungary	0.907	Russian Fed.	0.901	Rwanda	0.899	Algeria	-0.937	Turkey	-0.790	Libya	-0.718	
22	Denmark	Italy	0.852	India	0.851	India	0.851	Lesotho	-0.878	Algeria	-0.822	Iran	-0.797	
23	Egypt	South Africa	0.828	Sri Lanka	0.793	Hungary	0.791	Eritrea	-0.869	Guinea-Bissau	-0.860	Lesotho	-0.774	
	Eq. Guinea	Tunisia	0.881	Burundi	0.735	Turkey	0.686	North Korea	-0.811	India	-0.762	Ghana	-0.760	
25	Eritrea	Ethiopia	0.944	Swaziland	0.889	Ukraine	0.859	Singapore	-0.909	South Africa	-0.895	Sri Lanka	-0.883	
26	Estonia	Czech Republic	0.765	Rwanda	0.743	Portugal	0.673	Algeria	-0.698	Turkey	-0.491	Saudi Arabia	-0.396	
27	Ethiopia	Eritrea	0.944	Ukraine	0.778	Madagascar	0.749	Singapore	-0.766	Egypt	-0.764	Sri Lanka	-0.735	
28	Finland	Slovenia	0.795	Russian Fed.	0.793	Canada	0.781	Madagascar	-0.756	Algeria	-0.706	Mauritania	-0.626	
29	France	Rwanda	0.940	Russian Fed.	0.939	Canada	0.932	Eritrea	-0.822	Algeria	-0.816	Sierra Leone	-0.812	
30	Georgia	Saudi Arabia	0.560	Italy	0.462	B&H	0.461	Cuba	-0.596	Morocco	-0.556	Thailand	-0.532	
31	Germany	Tanzania	0.934	Zambia	0.879	Australia	0.851	PNG	-0.907	Tunisia	-0.884	Mali	-0.880	
32	Ghana	Tanzania	0.816	Mongolia	0.814	China	0.811	Burkina Faso	-0.906	Philippines	-0.877	Tunisia	-0.847	
33	Greece	Ireland	0.780	Finland	0.651	Pakistan	0.563	Turkmenistan	-0.622	Jordan	-0.621	Indonesia	-0.522	
34	Guinea	PNG	0.841	Burkina Faso	0.826	Tunisia	0.818	Korea	-0.928	Tanzania	-0.903	Germany	-0.851	
35	Guinea-Bissau	Algeria		Lesotho		Eritrea	0.796			Sri Lanka	-0.883		-0.873	
	Hungary	Russian Fed.	0.949	Croatia	0.944	Poland	0.940	Algeria	-0.952	Lesotho	-0.936	Senegal	-0.891	

				Highest						Lowes	st		
SN	Country	1st country	r (1)	2 nd country	r (2)	3rd country	r (3)	106th country	r (106)		r (105)	104th country	r (104)
	Iceland	Cuba	0.573	Uruguay	0.543	Netherlands	0.533	Saudi Arabia	-0.527	Viet Nam		Indonesia	-0.382
	India	China		Croatia	0.963	Australia	0.954		-0.985	Senegal	-0.980	Sierra Leone	-0.977
-	Indonesia	Turkmenistan		Moldova	0.461	Spain	0.408			Cote d'Ivoire		Cuba	-0.580
	Iran	Lesotho	0.935	PNG	0.934		0.912	India		Tanzania		Zambia	-0.908
	Ireland Israel	Netherlands Canada	0.791	Greece India		Finland Rwanda	0.769	Guinea-Bissau Algeria		Thailand Tunisia		Algeria Saudi Arabia	-0.539 -0.764
	Italy	USA	0.703	Bulgaria	0.703	B&H	0.879	Guinea-Bissau	-0.905	Lesotho	-0.887	Algeria	-0.878
	Japan	Mongolia	0.891	Tanzania	0.870		0.797	Senegal		Burkina Faso		Swaziland	-0.825
	Jordan	Turkmenistan	0.722	Korea	0.646	Morocco	0.622	PNG		Burkina Faso	-0.782	Mali	-0.749
46	Kazakhstan	Russian Fed.	0.838	Singapore	0.815	Sri Lanka	0.797	Eritrea	-0.786	Swaziland	-0.727	Sierra Leone	-0.718
47	Kenya	Algeria	0.886	Iran	0.746	Guinea-Bissau	0.710	Bulgaria	-0.876	B&H	-0.875	Moldova	-0.857
	Korea	Tanzania	0.903	Zambia	0.879	Ghana	0.808	Guinea		Burkina Faso		Philippines	-0.833
	Kyrgyzstan	Madagascar		Ethiopia	0.527	Ghana	0.453	Burundi		Belarus		Montenegro	-0.555
	Lao PDR	Bangladesh	0.648	Belgium	0.543		0.539	Guinea-Bissau		Algeria		Kenya	-0.388
	Latvia Lesotho	Rwanda Mali	0.905	Romania	0.857	UK	0.853	Algeria		Sierra Leone Croatia		Turkey Tanzania	-0.767 -0.961
	Libya	Turkey		Iran	0.933	Algeria		India India	-0.9859			Poland	-0.788
	Lithuania	Croatia		India	0.774	Tanzania	0.793	Iran		Lesotho		Algeria	-0.781
	Luxembourg	Rwanda		Canada	0.581	Canada	0.581	Saudi Arabia		Madagascar		Algeria	-0.495
	Madagascar	Mauritania		Thailand	0.773	Ethiopia	0.749	Finland	-0.756			Pakistan	-0.736
	Malaysia	Tunisia		Burkina Faso	0.868	Iran				Tanzania		Taiwan	-0.866
	Mali	Swaziland		Tunisia		Lesotho	0.939			Australia	-0.940	South Africa	-0.931
	Mauritania	Madagascar		Ethiopia	0.701	Sierra Leone	0.676			Romania		Montenegro	-0.683
	Moldova	Romania		Latvia	0.849	India	0.830			Kenya		Turkey	-0.842
	Mongolia	Japan		Taiwan	0.857	Sri Lanka	0.821	Malaysia		Burkina Faso		Senegal	-0.817
	Montenegro	India		Taiwan	0.820	,	0.806	Ü		Sierra Leone		Lesotho	-0.820
	Morocco	Thailand		Uruguay	0.703	Madagascar	0.672	Saudi Arabia Korea		Burundi Coto d'Ivoine		North Macedonia	
	Nepal Netherlands	Botswana Canada		Belarus France	0.772	Guinea Russian Fed.	0.721	Sierra Leone	-0.765	Cote d'Ivoire Algeria		Tanzania Turkey	-0.524 -0.712
66	New Zealand	Bulgaria		Italy		Hungary	0.773	Thailand		Guinea-Bissau	-0.752		-0.614
_	Niger	Nigeria		Finland	0.725	Uganda	0.686			Lithuania		Germany	-0.550
	Nigeria	Niger		PNG	0.777	Cuba	0.761	Zambia		Germany	-0.669	•	-0.652
69	North Korea	Australia	0.924	India	0.914	Zambia	0.899	Sierra Leone	-0.925	Tunisia	-0.907	Senegal	-0.905
	North Macedonia	Bangladesh		Burundi	0.618	B&H	0.609	Morocco		Algeria	-0.571	Madagascar	-0.524
71	Norway	Rwanda		Russian Fed.	0.885	Canada	0.876	Sierra Leone		Algeria		Lesotho	-0.798
	Pakistan	Finland		Rwanda	0.741	Canada	0.733	Madagascar		Algeria		Eritrea	-0.553
	PNG	Tunisia		Mali	0.938	Iran	0.934	Tanzania		India		Zambia	-0.932
	Peru	Finland	0.548	Iceland	0.508	Venezuela	0.494	Indonesia	-0.551			Kyrgyzstan	-0.355 -0.792
	Philippines Poland	Burkina Faso Croatia		Burundi Hungary	0.801	Guinea South Africa	0.801	Ghana Senegal	-0.877 -0.950	Korea Lesotho		Tanzania Algeria	-0.792
	Portugal	Hungary			0.894	Rwanda	0.892	Algeria		Guinea-Bissau		Lesotho	-0.740
	Romania	India		Australia	0.862	Moldova	0.859	Sierra Leone		Algeria		Senegal	-0.830
	Russian Fed.	Rwanda	0.968	South Africa	0.956		0.952	Algeria		Sierra Leone		Turkey	-0.836
80	Rwanda	Canada	0.968	Canada	0.968	UK	0.950	Algeria	-0.936	Sierra Leone	-0.844	Turkey	-0.822
81	Saudi Arabia	Eq. Guinea	0.676	Tunisia	0.663	Spain	0.630	Morocco	-0.891	Canada	-0.789	Israel	-0.764
82	Senegal	Lesotho		Sierra Leone	0.916		0.910		-0.980			Australia	-0.965
83	Serbia	South Africa		South Africa	0.845	Russian Fed.	0.834	Algeria		Lesotho		Eritrea	-0.725
84	Sierra Leone	Swaziland		Senegal	0.916		0.910		-0.977	Australia		South Africa	-0.942
	Singapore	Taiwan		Sri Lanka	0.882			Eritrea		Swaziland		Sierra Leone	-0.874
	Slovakia Slovenia	India France	0.946			Hungary Rwanda	0.913	Lesotho Guinea-Bissau		Sierra Leone		Swaziland Madagascar	-0.891 -0.716
	South Africa	Russian Fed.		China	0.793			Swaziland		Lesotho		Sierra Leone	-0.716
	Spain	Saudi Arabia				Tanzania		Guinea	-0.686	PNG	-0.681		-0.642
	Sri Lanka	South Africa		Taiwan		Russian Fed.		Eritrea		Eritrea		Eritrea	-0.883
	Swaziland	Mali		Sierra Leone		Lesotho	0.931	South Africa	-0.965	India		Australia	-0.933
	Sweden	Netherlands			0.734			Algeria		Sierra Leone		Turkey	-0.687
-	Switzerland	Pakistan		Sweden		Netherlands		Eritrea		Ethiopia		Sierra Leone	-0.408
	Taiwan	India				China		Lesotho	-0.952			Swaziland	-0.899
	Tanzania Theiland	India				Zambia		Tunisia	-0.974			Lesotho	-0.961
	Thailand Tunicia	Madagascar PNG		Morocco Mali		Uruguay Senegal		Bulgaria Tanzania	-0.807	Italy Zambia		Denmark North Korea	-0.739 -0.907
	Tunisia Turkey	Senegal Senegal	0.981			Senegal Sierra Leone		Tanzania Poland		Hungary	-0.941		-0.907
	Turkmenistan	North Korea	0.784			Tanzania		Tunisia	-0.825			Guinea	-0.709
	Uganda	Niger		Nigeria		Cuba		Indonesia	-0.543			Saudi Arabia	-0.472
	Ukraine	Eritrea		Ethiopia		Sierra Leone		South Africa	-0.730			Australia	-0.674
		Russian Fed.		Rwanda		South Africa		Algeria		Sierra Leone		Turkey	-0.861
101	UK	reassian rea.	0.,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,										-0.610
101 102	UK Uruguay	Cuba	0.833	Austria	0.745	Morocco	0.703	Saudi Arabia	-0.674	Bulgaria	-0.612	Italy	-0.010
101 102 103 104	Uruguay USA	Cuba Australia	0.833 0.934	Italy	0.932	India	0.930	Lesotho	-0.920	Senegal	-0.882	Swaziland	-0.866
101 102 103 104 105	Uruguay USA Venezuela	Cuba Australia Norway	0.833 0.934 0.613	Italy Sri Lanka	0.932 0.557	India Bangladesh	0.930 0.541	Lesotho Malaysia	-0.920 -0.563	Senegal Kyrgyzstan	-0.882 -0.538	Swaziland Eritrea	-0.866 -0.503
101 102 103 104 105 106	Uruguay USA	Cuba Australia	0.833 0.934 0.613	Italy Sri Lanka Jordan	0.932 0.557 0.473	India Bangladesh North Korea	0.930 0.541 0.464	Lesotho	-0.920 -0.563	Senegal Kyrgyzstan Iceland	-0.882 -0.538	Swaziland Eritrea Greece	-0.866

Note: B&H: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Russian Fed.: Russian Federation, Eq. Guinea: Equatorial Guinea, PNG: Papua New Guinea, UK: United Kingdom




Fig. 1 The World Map as per the Block structure derived, taking the USA as the nodal country.

Tables 6A, 6B, and 7, together with Figure 1, when investigated manually, reveal some interesting insights in the geopolitical and geo-economic context –

- 1. Figure 1 shows that the conflicts of the richest 1% of different countries with that of the USA are concentrated mostly in the regions of Western Africa, MENAT (Middle East and North African countries (MENA) and Turkey), Eastern Africa, i.e., the Horn of Africa, a part in Eastern Europe, and near the South China Sea.
- 2. The STR- block contains four neighboring countries from Western Africa Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, and Sierra Leone. Evidently, the richest 1% in this region is competing with the richest 1% of the USA, and other countries which have a strong positive correlation (synergy) with the USA. It is no wonder that the countries in the STR- block will be strongly positively correlated with one another taking the highest three positive correlations, Senegal has strong positive correlation with Lesotho, Sierra Leone and Mali; Guinea-Bissau has the same with Algeria, Lesotho, and Eritrea; Mali has the same with Swaziland, Tunisia, and Lesotho; and Sierra Leone has the same with Swaziland, Senegal, and Mali (see Table 7). If Burkina Faso (MOD-), Nigeria, and Niger (WNC-) from the same region are included in this set of countries, a prominent case of conflict with the involvement of the USA, Russian Federation, China, and France in this region (Chin & Bartos, 2024; ELDoh, 2023; Gurjar, 2023; Reuters, 2024) may shed some light on the negative correlation.
- 3. The two countries in the STR- block Lesotho and Swaziland (now called Eswatini) are surrounded on all sides (except that Swaziland has a short border shared with Mozambique) by South Africa, which has a positive correlation with the USA. Evidently, the richest 1% of these two countries are facing stiff competition from the richest 1% of the surrounding South Africa. While Lesotho has a strong positive correlation with Mali, Iran, and Papua New Guinea, Swaziland has the same with Mali, Sierra Leone, and Lesotho.
- 4. Three other African countries in the STR- block are Algeria, Tunisia, and Kenya. Whereas Algeria and Tunisia are neighboring North African countries that experienced the Arab Spring about 15 years ago, Kenya is in the Horn of Africa and has a violent history of ethnic conflicts within and in the surrounding countries (Ethiopia Peace Observatory, 2024). Kenya has a strong positive correlation with Algeria, Iran, and Guinea-Bissau (see Table 7). Another country in the Horn is Ethiopia lying north of Kenya. Ethiopia has a moderately strong negative correlation with the USA but a high positive correlation with the neighboring Eritrea and with Ukraine from Eastern Europe (see Table 7). The first country in the MOD- block Libya is another MENA country having the shock of the Arab Spring.
- 5. The remaining two countries in the STR- block Iran and Turkey are from the Middle East and have recent history of internal political disturbances and violence.
- 6. Although belonging roughly to these regions, some countries are rather in the STR+ block Tanzania and Rwanda (two neighboring countries sharing a border with or in close proximity with Kenya), South Africa (as mentioned earlier), Egypt (in MENA, and experienced Arab Spring). The first country in the MOD+ block Zambia is a neighboring country of Tanzania.
- 7. Ukraine (MOD-), Austria, and Belarus (WNC-) are three countries from Eastern Europe surrounded by STR+ countries. While Ukraine is at war at present with Russia, Belarus has seen recent internal political turmoil (Stiftung, 2024). Austria has its own political problems, and it has close relations with Belarus, although they do not share a border.

8. Around the South China Sea, Malaysia and the Philippines are in the MOD- group, along with Papua New Guinea in close proximity and Thailand sharing a border with Malaysia. Viet Nam, to the east of the South China Sea, is not positively correlated with the USA. This region has geopolitical geo-economic tensions with the involvement of the USA, China, India, the Russian Federation, and Japan (Turker, 2023).

The block structure of the countries presented in Tables 6A and 6B, when read together with Table 7, can reveal many other insights on which further research can be carried out. But what can be concluded without investing the block structure further is that **the TCC** is in geopolitical and geo-economic synergy and conflict, where the plutocrats as agents of the TCC are pivotal in the process. The term 'geopolitical' is added here because military actions are observed in some of these relations.

Combining all the findings of this study, it can now be asserted that the research hypothesis of this study stands proven, although the resulting block structure has both geo-economic and geopolitical significance.

In preparing the blocks, the USA was taken as the nodal country; if, instead, some other country is chosen as the nodal country, there may be appear a different block structure. It depends on the purpose of the study which country is to be chosen as the nodal country for preparing the block structure.

V. CONCLUSION

Taking the richest 1% of every country as belonging to the TCC and as a group of persons promoting the TNS over the financial sovereignty of their own country through TNP and plutocratic practices, this study, taking cue from the earlier studies and findings, investigated whether share of the richest 1% in national income of different countries have any interrelation or not, and if there exists a relation, then what its nature is in terms of geo-economics. The study took the period 1980-2022 for investigation and selected 107 countries based on the availability of data. The share of the richest 1% in the pre-tax national income was retrieved from the WID.world for the period 1980-2022 and used for these 107 countries.

Dropping the time dimension, this study then prepared the correlation matrix of the share of the richest 1% in these 107 countries. Inspection of this correlation matrix was carried out.

It has been found that – (1) the richest 1% of different countries, as plutocrats, can be treated as agents of the TCC, (2) these plutocrats are closely integrated within the TCC, (3) whenever the plutocrats of some particular countries win better command over their own countries, the plutocrats of some other particular countries lose a part of their command over their own countries, i.e., there is both synergy and conflict within the TCC, and (4) the block structure of synergies and conflicts, when prepared taking USA as the nodal country, suggests that the synergies and conflicts have geopolitical and geo-economic significance – the regions of Western Africa, the Horn of Africa, MENA countries with Turkey, South China Sea, and partly the Eastern Europe are found having conflict the USA and other countries in synergy with the USA, in terms of command of the plutocrats over their own countries.

The present study has certain limitations. First, the countries in synergy have been formed into a single block representing one class of capitalists assumingly cooperating with one another, whereas it might well be that it comprises more than one block such that two countries in two blocks appear to be correlated, but they might not be in synergy (e.g., USA and China); it will be very astonishing if the capitalists of USA and China are really in synergy as is found in this study. This needs further research for preparing a keener block structure. Secondly, this study shows synergic and conflicting movements of the share of the richest 1%, but it does not explain the mechanism by which the share of the richest 1% in one country can be in synergy or conflict with the same in another country. This, too, needs further research. Thirdly, although the strongly positive and strongly negative correlations have revealed some geopolitical and geo-economic insights on the role of the plutocracy, there might be variables other than the TNP of the TCC that will be more suitable to explain the positive and negative correlations. This needs alternative research efforts.

Despite these limitations, following this study, or any other study of a similar nature, a government can evaluate the nature of its richest 1% and then take appropriate measures to save the country from any unwelcome influence of the TNS.

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