Citation:

Desi Ilona. "Supervisory Board Independent and Earning Management: Meta-Analysis" International Research Journal of Economics and Management Studies, Vol. 4, No. 8, pp. 205-210, 2025. Crossref. http://doi.org/10.56472/25835238/IRJEMS-V4I8P121

Abstract:

This meta-analysis examines the relationship between supervisory board independence and earnings management by synthesising empirical evidence from 30 studies. Using a random-effects model to account for heterogeneity, the analysis reveals a significant negative association (overall effect size = 0.29, p < 0.001), indicating that greater board independence correlates with reduced earnings manipulation. Subgroup analyses revealed a stronger effect in the manufacturing sector (0.33, p < 0.001) compared to the services sector (0.19, p = 0.07), suggesting industry-specific governance dynamics. The study addresses heterogeneity (Q = 55.51, p < 0.001; I² = 72%) and confirms minimal publication bias through the symmetry of the funnel plot. Findings align with agency theory, emphasising the governance role of independent boards in enhancing the integrity of financial reporting. Practical implications underscore the need for sector-specific governance policies, while limitations suggest the importance of future research on contextual moderators. This research consolidates fragmented literature and provides policymakers with evidence-based insights to strengthen corporate oversight mechanisms.

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Keywords:

Supervisory Board Independence, Earnings Management, Meta-Analysis, Indonesia.